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1. Introduction 
Imaginative resistance “occurs when an otherwise competent imaginer finds it difficult to engage 
in some sort of prompted imaginative activity” (Gendler and Liao 2016). There are now many 
puzzles surrounding this phenomenon (see e.g., Gendler and Liao 2016, Kieran and Lopes 2003, 
Todd 2009, Walton 2006, Weatherson 2004). In this paper, we focus on the oldest and most widely 
discussed puzzle, which was baptized by Tamar Gendler in her (2000), and traces back to Kendall 
Walton, Richard Moran, and ultimately, David Hume.  
This version of the puzzle of imaginative resistance involves “our inability or 
unwillingness to imagine counter-moral propositions in fiction” (Kind and Kung 2016: 23). In 
Hume’s words, there are many things in a fiction which we know are descriptively wrong, and that 
will “detract but little from the value of those compositions” (Hume 1757, para. 33). For example, 
we seem to have no problem with leprechauns, hobbits and vampires, which we know do not exist. 
But “a very violent effort is requisite to change our judgment of manners, and excite sentiments of 
approbation or blame, love or hatred, different from those to which the mind, from long custom, 
has been familiarized” (ibid.). For example, if Shakespeare had written all the circumstances of 
Duncan’s murder at the hands of Macbeth exactly as we know them, but added that Macbeth’s 
actions were morally praiseworthy, this would have been very difficult for us to imagine (Moran 
1994). The puzzle, then, concerns how we can explain the difference in difficulty between 
imagining counterevaluative and counterdescriptive propositions.2 
The empirical assumption underlying the puzzle is that people do indeed experience more 
imaginative resistance when they attempt to imagine scenarios that are evaluatively deviant rather 
than descriptively deviant. We apparently have a harder time imagining that something ugly is 
beautiful, that something morally wrong is right, that something dull is funny, or that something 
clumsy is elegant, than we do imagining something that is descriptively false. 
This “curious asymmetry” (Kieran and Lopes 2003: 8; Matravers 2003: 91) is widely 
assumed in the literature, not very often argued for, and frequently restricted to moral deviance. 
For example, Moran asks,  
Why can we not, as it seems, treat the judgments of morality and decency the same way 
we treat any other judgments, and accept as fictionally true what the story tells us (or 
implies) is true, and comfortably leave our genuine attitudes at the door? What happens to 
our sense of distance at that point, the distance between what we can imagine and what we 
actually believe? The suggestion here is that we cannot treat these as on a par with other 
fictional truths. (1994: 97) 
Magdalena Balcerak Jackson writes that “[m]ost convincing examples of imaginative resistance 
involve requests to imagine situations where morally highly deviant behaviors and attitudes are 
endorsed” (2016: 47). Neil van Leeuwen wonders why “it seems easy to incorporate outlandish 
descriptive propositions into our understanding of the story, but our minds are far less flexible 
about incorporating outlandish moral propositions” (2016: 103-4).3  
Like Hume and Moran, Walton uses introspection and thought experiments to motivate the 
claim that imagining counterevaluatives is more difficult than imagining counterdescriptives 
(1990: 154-5; 1994: 32 ff.), though he expands the claim beyond morality to other evaluatives. For 
example, 
If in a story a comedian tells [“a really dumb joke”] and the author simply writes explicitly 
in the text that it is hilariously funny, I expect that I would attribute a juvenile or an 
incomprehensible sense of humor to the narrator, and stick with my own judgment that the 
joke is not funny. I insist on applying my own sense of humor. (Walton 1994: 40)  
This example of Walton’s shows that it isn’t just moral deviance that we resist, but 
counterevaluatives of many kinds (see also Yablo 2002: 485). As we said above, this was Hume’s 
original point. In this paper, then, we will speak of the puzzle of imaginative resistance in terms 
of counterevaluatives broadly conceived. 
What sorts of reasons are there for believing that imaginative resistance is more powerful 
for counterevaluatives than for counterdescriptives? The most common strategy is to provide a 
few short narratives or narrative sketches to pump intuitions into agreement. “We happily go along 
with talking mice and time-travel tales, but we balk if recreational torture is endorsed, or presented 
as truly permissible within the story” (Driver 2008: 302). A second strategy differentiates between 
kinds of imagination: one kind draws on the faculty of sentiment, and another on (what Hume 
called) the faculty of understanding. Desire-like (Currie 2002) or value-like (Stokes 2006) 
imagination on the sentiment side is more difficult to control than cognitive imagination on the 
understanding side. If this is true, it would explain why we experience more resistance with 
counterevaluatives than counterdescriptives. A third reason is that while we often import real 
beliefs, desires and values into fictions (e.g., we assume Sherlock Holmes has at least one kidney 
because we believe all humans do), we can also export imaginings into real beliefs, desires and 
values (e.g., we might come to believe, desire and value things about 19th century London because 
of Dickens’s novels). Imaginative resistance is then argued to be about what we ought to imagine, 
given that we risk exporting what we imagine into what we believe, desire and value. We ought to 
resist imagining any counterevaluative that might “contaminate” (that is, negatively affect) our 
moral framework (Gendler 2000). A fourth reason might be that there are no counterdescriptives 
that cannot be imagined. One of the best contenders for counterdescriptives that we cannot imagine 
are conceptual impossibilities, which Gendler argues can be imagined after all (Gendler 2000). If 
we can imagine that the sum of five and seven both is and is not equal to twelve, then certainly we 
can imagine any descriptive claim in a fiction. And this is not so, Gendler claims, for 
counterevaluatives. 
But there are also good reasons for doubting that it is more difficult to imagine 
counterevaluatives than counterdescriptives (see, e.g., Mothersill 2006, Tanner 1994, Todd 2009, 
Weatherson 2004, Yablo 2002). One is that Hume’s distinction between sentiment and 
understanding might be cognitively crude. If there is no defensible distinction between the faculties 
of sentiment and understanding, or if such faculties are unmotivated, or do not exist, the asymmetry 
disappears. Another is that we might not believe there are moral facts, in which case, there can be 
no moral counterevaluatives, and again the distinction loses its bite. Or perhaps we could deny any 
strict distinction between facts and values (see Marchetti and Marchetti 2017). We might also 
target Gendler’s claim that conceptual impossibilities can be imagined. Stock (2003), for example, 
argues that they cannot. 
To help decide the issue, we could turn to experiment. Black and Barnes (2017) show that 
there is quite a bit of individual variability in the amount of imaginative resistance people 
experience, and also that imaginative resistance is positively correlated with moral features (e.g., 
moral authority, moral harm, disgust sensitivity, fear of moral contagion, etc.). If this is right, 
people do experience some form of imaginative resistance when exposed to certain 
counterevaluatives. What we are interested in, however, is the assumption on which much of the 
work on this topic is premised: whether it really is more difficult to imagine a counterevaluative 
than a counterdescriptive. 
In our study, we investigated whether the degree to which a proposition was 
counterevaluative or counterdescriptive influenced levels of imaginative resistance. Differently 
put, we explored whether imaginative resistance is sensitive not only to proposition type 
(evaluative vs. descriptive) but content, independently of type. We found that it was. A pilot study 
indicated that, in general, counterevaluative claims generate significantly more resistance than 
counterdescriptive claims. However, the degree of counterfactuality also had a significant effect 
on resistance judgments.4 Differently put, imaginative resistance cannot be accounted for purely 
in terms of claim type. Instead, features of content (of which degree of counterfactuality is but one) 
seem to have an impact, too. 
The pilot study raised a worry for imaginative resistance traditionally conceived: What if 
the detected overall difference in resistance between counterevaluative and counterdescriptive 
claims is not in fact due to claim type, but instead to features of content for which the experiment 
does not control? More precisely, resistance might be triggered by contents that represent states of 
affairs that are considered unlikely, astonishing, unusual, etc. For simplicity, we introduce a catch-
all term for potential resistance-inducing properties of this sort: “weirdness.” It might turn out that 
the counterevaluatives invoked in the literature as those that produce imaginative resistance (e.g., 
the proposition that the practice of genocide or slavery is morally acceptable, or that it is evil to 
associate with people of other races (Walton, 1994: 28)) are simply “weirder” than the 
counterdescriptives with which they are standardly compared, (e.g., the proposition that there is a 
ring that makes its wearer invisible, or that a village in Scotland appears and disappears every one 
hundred years (Walton, 1994: 31)). If this turns out to be correct, the difference in imaginative 
resistance triggered by different claims would thus not be due to claim type, but weirdness of claim 
content. Our study addressed this worry by exploring imaginative resistance across claim types 
while controlling for a variety of features that might render their content weird. 
 
2. Experiment 
2.1 Participants 
1216 participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk to complete a paid online survey on 
Qualtrics. The IP location was restricted to the US. Subjects who failed an attention test, took less 
than 15 seconds to complete the main task, changed their response more than 10 times, or had 
native languages that were not English were excluded. The exclusion criteria were determined in 
advance of the experiment. 845 subjects remained, of whom 441 were female. The average age 
was 38.8 years (SD=12.3 years).  
2.2 Method and Materials 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of twenty-four conditions in a 6 (claim type: evaluative 
1 vs. evaluative 2 vs. evaluative 3 vs. descriptive 1 vs. descriptive 2 vs. descriptive 3) x 4 (degree 
of counterfactuality: low vs. medium-low vs. medium-high vs. high) design. Evaluative 1 involved 
a moral norm, evaluative 2 involved a humor norm, and evaluative 3 involved an aesthetic norm. 
Each participant responded to three questions regarding weirdness and three questions regarding 
imaginative resistance (truth, difficulty, and possibility). Appendix 2 in the Supplementary 
Materials contains the complete text of all scenarios and questions.5 We will use the aesthetic 
condition as an example. The prompt and questions (variations of degree in square brackets) read:  
Adaleine, Picasso’s greatest student, was a prolific painter, whose work was unfortunately lost to history - with 
the exception of her last painting: A 3 x 4' canvas, painted from edge to edge in the exact same shade of yellow 
as the McDonald's golden arches. It is [a somewhat beautiful paintingi / a beautiful paintingii / a very beautiful 
paintingiii / without doubt one of the most beautiful works ever madeiv]. 
Q1 (weirdness 1): How unusual is it that Adaleine’s painting is [a somewhat beautiful paintingi / a beautiful 
paintingii / a very beautiful paintingiii / without doubt one of the most beautiful works ever madeiv]? 
(1=completely ordinary; 7=completely unusual) 
Q2 (weirdness 2): If there is a world where Adaleine’s painting is [a somewhat beautiful paintingi / a beautiful 
paintingii / a very beautiful paintingiii / without doubt one of the most beautiful works ever madeiv], how 
different would this world be from ours? (1=completely the same; 7=completely different) 
Q3 (weirdness 3): How surprised would you be if you found out that Adaleine’s painting is [a somewhat 
beautiful paintingi / a beautiful paintingii / a very beautiful paintingiii / without doubt one of the most beautiful 
works ever madeiv] in our world? (1=completely unsurprised; 7=completely surprised) 
       Q4 (truth): If you were to find the previous scenario within a work of fiction, to what extent would you    
       agree that the following statement is true in the fictional scenario? (1=completely agree, 7=completely  
       disagree) 
“Adaleine’s painting is [a somewhat beautiful paintingi / a beautiful paintingii / a very beautiful paintingiii 
/ without doubt one of the most beautiful works ever madeiv].” 
Q5 (difficulty): How difficult is it for you to imagine that Adaleine’s painting is [a somewhat beautiful 
paintingi / a beautiful paintingii / a very beautiful paintingiii / without doubt one of the most beautiful works 
ever madeiv]? (1=very easy, 7=very difficult) 
Q6 (possibility): To what extent do you deem it possible to imagine that Adaleine’s painting is [a somewhat 
beautiful paintingi / a beautiful paintingii / a very beautiful paintingiii / without doubt one of the most beautiful 
works ever madeiv]? (1=completely possible, 7=completely impossible) 
Participants responded to all questions on Likert scales ranging from 1 to 7, which were anchored 
as specified above.  The order of test questions was fixed. The experimental prompts were 
preceded by an attention check and followed by a demographic questionnaire.  
2.3 Results  
Since we were interested in the impact of claim type and degree, we aggregated across scenarios 
of the same claim type. We conducted a mixed ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
(within-subjects factor: measure – truth vs. difficulty vs. possibility; between-subjects factors: 
claim type – evaluative vs. descriptive, degree – low vs. medium-low vs. medium-high vs. high). 
There was a significant main effect for degree F(3,837)=36.18, p<.001, 𝜂𝜂p2=.115, a significant 
main effect for measure F(1.80,1504.26)=47.06, p<.001, 𝜂𝜂p2=.053, a significant main effect for 
claim type F(1,837)=37.68, p<.001, 𝜂𝜂p2=.043. The measure*degree interaction was significant 
F(5.39, 1504.26)=9.63, p<.001, 𝜂𝜂p2=.033, and so were the measure*claim type interaction F(1.80, 
1504.26)=33.30, p<.001, 𝜂𝜂p2=.038 and the degree*claim type interaction F(3,837)=3.18, p=.023, 
𝜂𝜂p2=.011. The three-way interaction was not significant F(5.40, 1504.26)=.78, p=.577, 𝜂𝜂p2=.003. 
To further explore the effect of claim type and degree of counterfactuality on the three 
distinct measures of imaginative resistance, we ran an ANOVA each for truth, difficulty and 
possibility judgments. With truth as the dependent variable (Figure 7.1), claim type proved 
significant F(1,837)=93.38, p<.001, 𝜂𝜂p2=.10, and so did degree F(3,837)=5.62, p=.001, 𝜂𝜂p2=.02. 
The interaction was not significant F(3,837)=1.03, p=.38, 𝜂𝜂p2=.004.  
 Figure 7.1. Mean ratings of imaginative resistance in terms of truth for evaluative and descriptive 
claims across degrees of counterfactuality. Error bars designate standard error of the mean. 
For the dependent variable difficulty (Figure 7.2), claim type did not prove significant 
F(1,837)=3.25, p=.07, 𝜂𝜂p2=.004), degree was significant F(3,837)=35.16, p<.001, 𝜂𝜂p2=.11, and the 
interaction was not significant F(3,837)=1.57, p=.20, 𝜂𝜂p2=.006. 
 
Figure 7.2. Mean ratings of imaginative resistance in terms of difficulty for evaluative and 
descriptive claims across degrees of counterfactuality. Error bars designate standard error of the 
mean.  
For the dependent variable possibility (Figure 7.3), claim type proved significant F(1,837)=7.49, 
p=.006, 𝜂𝜂p2=.01, degree was significant F(3,837)=38.03, p<.001, 𝜂𝜂p2=.12, and the interaction was 
also significant (F(3,837)=4.45, p=.004, 𝜂𝜂p2=.02. 
 
Figure 7.3. Mean ratings of imaginative resistance in terms of possibility for evaluative 
and descriptive claims across degrees of counterfactuality. Error bars designate standard error of 
the mean. 
In short, while claim type has a considerable impact on imaginative resistance judgments 
regarding truth (𝜂𝜂p2=.10, a medium effect), it has next to no effect on either difficulty or possibility 
judgments (𝜂𝜂p2<.01, i.e. not even a small effect size). By contrast, degree of counterfactuality has 
a pronounced effect on difficulty (𝜂𝜂p2=.11) and possibility judgments (𝜂𝜂p2=.12), yet a much smaller 
effect on truth judgments (𝜂𝜂p2=.02).  
Next, we explored whether claim type still has an impact on imaginative resistance once 
weirdness of content is controlled for. Recall that for each target claim c, participants rated how 
unusual they consider c, to what extent a world in which c is true would differ from ours, and how 
surprised they would be to learn that c is actually the case. Averaging across the results, we 
calculated a weirdness composite score. Across conditions, reliability analyses produced a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .75 among the questions used to compute the weirdness score, indicating that 
the composite score was strongly internally consistent. On average, weirdness scores for the 
counterdescriptive claims (M=5.31, SD=1.45) were significantly higher than those for 
counterevaluative claims (M=4.77, SD=1.60), t(843)=-5.19, p<.001, Cohen’s d=.36, a small 
effect.6  
We also conducted hierarchical multiple regressions (HMRs) in order to explore whether 
claim type had an impact on the three measures of imaginative resistance, once weirdness of 
content had been controlled for. Table 7.1 summarizes the HMR results for all three types of 
imaginative resistance judgments. 
 Truth Difficulty Possibility 
  Predictor B SE b Β p B SE b β  p  b SE b β  p 
Step 1             
Constant 1.965 0.245  <.001 0.591 0.218  <.01 0.382 0.204  Ns 
Weirdness 0.344 0.047 0.247 <.001 0.73 0.041 0.519 <.001 0.636 0.039 0.492 <.001 
Step 2             
Constant 2.293 0.229  <.001 0.716 0.217  <.01 0.517 0.202  <.001 
Weirdness 0.435 0.044 0.312 <.001 0.764 0.041 0.544 <.001 0.673 0.039 0.521 <.001 
Claim Type -1.595 0.136 -0.369 <.001 -0.609 0.129 -0.14 <.001 -0.657 0.12 -0.164 <.001 
 
Table 7.1. Hierarchical regression analyses for truth (R2=.061 for Step 1; ∆R2=.132 for Step 2, 
all ps<.001), difficulty (R2=.270 for Step 1; ∆R2=.019 for Step 2, all ps<.001) and possibility 
(R2=.242 for Step 1; ∆R2=.026 for Step 2, all ps<.001). 
Truth: The first hierarchical multiple regression revealed that at stage one, weirdness 
contributed significantly to the regression model, F(1,844)=54.71, p<.001, and accounted for 6.1% 
of the variation in truth judgments. Introducing claim type explained an additional 13.2% of 
variation in truth judgments and this change in R² was significant, F(2,844)=100.67, p<.001. 
Together the two independent variables accounted for 19.3% of the variance in truth judgements. 
Furthermore, the positive value of b=.435 for weirdness  shows that weirdness was a positive 
predictor of truth – i.e., the weirder the claim, the less likely one was to accept it as true in the 
fiction. The negative value of b for claim type (i.e., -1.595) indicates that evaluative claims (coded 
as 0) were less likely to be accepted as true in the fiction than descriptive ones (coded as 1).  
Difficulty: The second hierarchical multiple regression revealed that at stage one, 
weirdness contributed significantly to the regression model, F(1,844)=311.43, p<.001, and 
accounted for 27.0% of the variation in difficulty judgments. Introducing claim type only 
explained an additional 1.9% of variation in difficulty judgments and this change in R² was 
significant, F(2,844)=170.90, p<.001. Together the two independent variables accounted for 
28.9% of the variance in difficulty judgments. As above, the weirder the claim, the more difficult 
it was to imagine it (b>0). Furthermore, descriptive claims were deemed less difficult to imagine 
than evaluative ones (b<0).  
Possibility: The third hierarchical multiple regression revealed that at stage one, weirdness 
contributed significantly to the regression model, F(1,844)=269.14, p<.001, and accounted for 
24.2% of the variation in possibility judgments. Introducing claim type only explained an 
additional 2.6% of variation in possibility judgments and this change in R² was significant, 
F(2,844)=154.18, p<.001. Together the two independent variables accounted for 26.8% of the 
variance in possibility judgments. Again, the weirder the claim, the more it was considered 
impossible to imagine it (b>0). Furthermore, descriptive claims were deemed less impossible to 
imagine than evaluative ones (b<0).  
In a final analysis we double-checked the results of the HMR analyses. The six scenarios, 
each of which invoked target claims differing in terms of degree of counterfactuality made for 24 
individual conditions. We conducted a Tukey post-hoc test for the weirdness scores of the 24 
conditions, and used the largest homogenous subset to explore the impact of claim type on the 
three measures of imaginative resistance. Differently put, we explored whether claim type still has 
an impact on judgments of imaginative resistance (truth, difficulty, and possibility), when the 
claims at stake are deemed weird to similar extents. Consistent with the HMR results, imaginative 
resistance conceived in terms of truth in fiction is significantly higher for evaluative claims than 
for descriptive claims (p<.001), though no significant difference could be detected across claim 
types for difficulty judgments (p=.32) or possibility judgments (p=.63). For the full analysis, cf. 
Appendix 3 in the Supplementary Materials.7 
2.4. Discussion 
So far, we have proceeded under the assumption that judgments regarding truth in fiction, 
difficulty and the possibility of imagining a non-actual state of affairs all belong to a single, 
uniform category. They all capture different, yet not unrelated, aspects of imaginative resistance 
(where imaginative resistance is understood in a broad sense), just as judgments regarding 
wrongness, blame, permissibility and punishment are standardly conceived of as different types of 
moral judgments. However, given the results, it might be helpful to draw more attention to the 
distinction between imaginative resistance conceived in terms of truth judgments on the one hand, 
and in terms of difficulty and possibility on the other. Our findings, we would like to suggest, 
might support a Dual Process Model of Imaginative Resistance, a model which is structurally (and 
structurally only) similar to Cushman’s (2008, 2013) Dual Process Model of Moral Judgment. 
According to the latter, wrongness and permissibility judgments are principally sensitive to mental 
states, whereas blame and punishment judgments are sensitive both to mental states and causal 
factors and outcomes. In the case of imaginative resistance, we found truth in fiction (or 
“fictionality”) judgments to be sensitive both to claim type (evaluative vs. descriptive) and features 
of content (degree of counterfactuality, or weirdness); difficulty and possibility judgments, by 
contrast, were found to be sensitive to features of content only (Figure 7.4).8 
 
Figure 7.4. The Dual Process Model of Imaginative Resistance 
 
3. General discussion 
There are many questions to ask concerning imaginative resistance. Some relate to its scope. For 
instance: Does imaginative resistance arise from certain moral propositions, evaluative 
propositions more generally, or also for counterdescriptive propositions? Do we resist any of these 
types of proposition more than others? And what explains the varying amounts and types of 
resistance? In the following, we will briefly trace out the implications of our findings for these 
questions. In closing we will address some possible directions for future research.  
Regarding scope, our pilot data showed that imaginative resistance does exist for non-
moral counterevaluative claims, as well as for counterdescriptive claims (see also Black and 
Barnes 2016). In other words, imaginative resistance has extremely wide scope. Do the different 
kinds of content face different levels of resistance in principle? We found that resistance can be 
stronger for non-moral counterevaluatives than for moral counterevaluatives. Thus, if Hume’s 
asymmetry did obtain, Hume, Walton and Yablo would be correct that it holds for 
counterevaluatives of all kinds, rather than merely moral counterevaluatives. The overwhelming 
focus in the literature on specifically moral counterevaluatives might therefore be somewhat 
inappropriate. We have also shown that resistance can be more pronounced for certain 
counterdescriptives than for certain counterevaluatives. Therefore, the strong claim that 
counterevaluatives always produce more imaginative resistance than counterdescriptives is false.  
More importantly, the results from our experiment show that out of the three measures of 
imaginative resistance tested (truth, difficulty, possibility), claim type matters only for truth 
judgments (that is, whether something is judged to be true in the fiction). And even in this case, 
claim type is neither the only significant factor driving resistance (degree is also significant: 
(F(3,837)=36.18, p<.001, 𝜂𝜂p2=.115), nor is its impact particularly pronounced (the effect size of 
the main effect of claim type on resistance was medium-small, 𝜂𝜂p2=.043). This suggests that, with 
respect to any of the three measures tested here, there is no principled asymmetry we can draw 
between counterevaluatives and counterdescriptives. Hence the alleged puzzle, according to which 
a difference in imaginative resistance is due exclusively or, at the very least, predominantly to 
claim type, simply does not exist. On the other hand, if Hume’s original puzzle is taken to refer 
only to imaginative resistance in the sense of resistance to truth in fiction judgments, and his 
observation is merely that claim type partially explains such resistance, the puzzle remains, though 
in a much weaker form than usually assumed. 
Turning to explanations of imaginative resistance, we found that the “weirdness” of a claim 
was the main explanatory factor for resistance conceived in terms of difficulty and possibility, and 
a partial predictor of resistance conceived in terms of judgments of truth in fiction. As long as one 
wants to postulate a general concept of imaginative resistance that captures a variety of distinct, 
though related phenomena, one might want to adopt a dual process model: difficulty and possibility 
judgments are influenced principally by features of content (as measured by degree of weirdness), 
whereas truth in fiction judgments are influenced by both content and claim type. A number of 
questions now stand out. First, what is weirdness? In our study it was an amalgamation of (i) 
unusualness, (ii) difference from the actual world, and (iii) surprisingness. But how exactly do 
these factors contribute to imaginative resistance? Second, what is it about truth in fiction 
judgments that makes them turn on content and claim type, while difficulty and possibility 
judgments are only tied to weirdness? We take up these questions in turn. 
3.1 Unusualness 
“We happily go along with talking mice and time-travel tales, but we balk if recreational torture is 
endorsed, or presented as truly permissible within the story” (Driver 2008: 302). Perhaps this is 
because fictions endorsing recreational torture are more unusual than talking mice tales, in the 
sense that most of us have some experience with fables, movies and cartoons that portray non-
human creatures that talk, but we don’t typically have as much experience with stories that involve 
morally permissible recreational torture. If imaginative resistance is a function of unusualness, and 
unusualness is a function of previous experience, then, a fortiori, imaginative resistance is a 
function of previous experience. This is just as Hume said: we resist imagining things “different 
from those to which the mind, from long custom, has been familiarized.” 
3.2 Difference from the Actual World 
Our reaction to time travel vs. torture might not rely on the perceived difference between the 
fictional and actual world; it would be very difficult to work out whether the time travel world is 
farther from the actual world than the morally permissible torture world. But the difference 
between the fictional and the actual world is very helpful in explaining the degree of imaginative 
resistance we experience. A story with talking mice is closer to the actual world than a story with 
talking mice who have also mastered time travel, which is closer still than a world in which those 
mice are morally right to travel through time in order to torture recreationally. 
Also, closeness of a fictional world to the actual world might contribute to an explanation 
of the political sense of imaginative resistance. This kind of imaginative resistance results any time 
we are asked to imagine something that we recognize might poison our actual beliefs, values and 
decision-making behavior. And it should hold equally for counterdescriptives as for 
counterevaluatives; as it does, for example, with imagining there to be important cognitive 
differences between human races, or imagining that the refugees in our countries have come 
purposely to cause damage to our societies. In other words, perhaps distance from our own 
doxastic-evaluative framework (or distance from the set of evaluative and descriptive truths) is a 
type of perceived distance from the actual world, which could explain the political sense of 
imaginative resistance. We refuse to imagine recreational torture as morally permissible because 
it would not be morally right in this world, whatever the case in other worlds (cf. Gendler, 2000). 
And we should not spend too much time in those worlds, lest we get any strange ideas. 
3.3 Surprisingness 
Surprise is a response to a violated expectation, and that expectation can be built upon several 
things, including previous experience, an inference, or convention. When the expectation violated 
is based on previous experience, surprise becomes related to unusualness, as often-experienced 
correlations that suddenly cease to hold will be judged unusual and surprising. When the 
expectation violated is built upon an inference about what will happen in a fiction, surprise 
becomes related to perceived nearness of a fictional world to the actual world, since the worlds 
about which our inferences fail in surprising ways will be judged as distant worlds. 
Expectations can also be set up by context, including pragmatic context and genre. Liao et 
al. (2014) show experimentally that imaginative resistance diminishes or vanishes when dealing 
with less realistic genres (see also Black et al. in press). Stock (2017: chapter 4) provides examples 
where children murder innocent parents, innocent people are tortured or killed, and women are 
degraded, and there is very little or no resistance because of the genre, whether gothic, erotic, 
horror or black humour. In these cases we do not balk, presumably because the pragmatic context 
(including genre) can change what we expect to happen, by changing our dispositions to 
characterize and frame certain objects and events (Camp forthcoming). The pragmatic context tells 
us “what to do” when confronted with a fiction. When we are confronted with a fiction about 
talking mice we know what to do: imagine the talking mice roughly as tiny people who like cheese 
and are afraid of cats. We can experience resistance if those mice do something talking mice don’t 
normally do in their genre. When we’re confronted with a story in which recreational torture is 
morally permissible, we will experience resistance only if that story isn’t embedded in a pragmatic 
context that makes recreational torture morally permissible. Because genre sets up expectations 
that are violated, genre could certainly be included in weirdness as an explanatory factor for 
imaginative resistance. 
3.4 Other Factors 
Our weirdness measure draws on unusualness, distance from the actual world and surprisingness. 
But presumably, other factors could figure into weirdness that would make it an even better 
predictor of imaginative resistance. Another possibility is that a fictional claim is weirder when its 
assertions contravene commitments that are more deeply held (following Todd 2009). That is, they 
are “weird” because we cannot work out how to tell a consistent story given the claims made in 
the fiction plus our existing commitments. We either don’t know which claims need to be altered, 
or how to alter them. Since moral beliefs are plausibly among those things to which we are most 
strongly committed, this would explain why we often experience imaginative resistance to 
counterevaluatives: because many of us are strongly committed to our values. But it also explains 
why we can find counterdescriptives that produce more resistance (Black and Barnes 2016), 
because to deny these we would have to make equally great (or greater) adjustments to our webs 
of commitment. Of course, all of this holds only when the reader knows that the author intends her 
to believe that the weird claim does follow from the narrative in the sense that if the scenario were 
actual, the weird claim would actually follow (Stock 2017: chapter 4). This isn’t always the case: 
sometimes authors simply want their readers to entertain weird claims for fun, puzzlement, or some 
other effect, in which case the resistance disappears. We can set aside these cases, since our studies 
follow the philosophical literature in presenting cases that do seem to ask the reader to assent that 
p follows from q in the scenario (e.g. that shooting Jack and Jill was the right thing to do given the 
other features of the case). If the centrality of the commitments countered by the scenario does 
play a role in determining weirdness, imaginative resistance can then be used as a partial measure 
for how central a commitment is. The suggestion would be: the more difficult it is to see a 
counterfactual inference through, the more likely it is that the inference requires denying a central 
commitment. 
Another potential source of weirdness is the epistemological authority of the author 
(Matravers 2003). According to Matravers, we will trust journalists to tell us which events took 
place, but not what is morally right or hilariously funny. In other words, it isn’t the content that 
drives imaginative resistance, but the perceived epistemological status of the author. While our 
results show that imaginative resistance is not unique to evaluatives, we have not explored an idea 
along Matravers’s line. It is certainly possible that we might resist imagining when an author’s 
authority breaks down. We merely urge caution in thinking that such authority only breaks down 
when it comes to values. People can and do accept value authorities, from advice columnists to 
religious leaders (Stock 2005), and likewise when it comes to descriptive claims, people can and 
do reject the authority of certain sources, for example, Breitbart News and Donald Trump. In other 
words, claims deriving from sources whose authority we do not trust might strike us as weird. The 
reverse also holds: when we encounter a weird headline, we often inquire about its author or 
source.  
Another possible weirdness-factor can be inferred from Weatherson (2004). Weatherson 
asserts that a fictional claim will be resisted in imagination when it violates the Virtue principle, 
which is premised on the idea that some fictional claims are the kind that must be true in virtue of 
lower level facts. The principle states that it must be possible to work out (from what’s given in 
the story) what p is true in virtue of, when the story is about those lower level facts (Weatherson 
2004: 18).9 When Virtue is not satisfied, we experience imaginative resistance. For example, 
recreational torture is morally wrong in virtue of the harm that torture does. If it were possible to 
torture people recreationally in a way that caused no harm, perhaps it would be morally 
permissible. It is possible therefore that violating Virtue is a further source of weirdness.  
In a somewhat similar vein, Kathleen Stock argues that we do not usually need to make 
recourse to lower level facts. Rather, when we fail to imagine something, it is because we do not 
understand it (2005). That is, we fail to find a context that makes sense of the scenario we are 
asked to imagine. Stock and Weatherson will therefore agree that whether we can find a way to 
understand the fiction in terms of its context or lower level facts will be relative to the individual. 
In our view, Stock and Weatherson (and others, like Nanay 2010) identify another possible source 
of weirdness: we cannot imagine something when we do not understand it (cannot make sense of 
it), whether because we cannot work out how it could obtain in terms of lower level facts or 
because of the context, including the presumed intentions of the author. This notion of weirdness 
as a lack of confidence in the quality of one’s epistemological position with respect to drawing 
certain inferences might be resolved into unusualness and distance from the actual world, but 
perhaps not. 
 
4. Conclusion 
With the work of Black and Barnes (2016, 2017), Black et al. (in press), Liao et al. (2014), and 
Phelan (2017), we’re still just beginning to bring empirical data to bear on philosophical issues of 
imaginative resistance. With respect to further avenues of research, we think it would be fruitful 
to follow up on the factors contributing to weirdness. We should like to know how many there are, 
what the nature of each is, and how each contributes to imaginative resistance.  
Another issue worth pursuing is the discrepancy we found between judgments concerning 
truth on the one hand, and difficulty and possibility on the other. Both the claim type and the 
content seem to affect whether people judge something to be true in a fiction, while only content 
affects whether people judge something fictional to be difficult or (im)possible to imagine. As we 
mentioned above, this might be congenial to a dual process model of imaginative resistance. The 
main question remains, however. Why are judgments concerning truth in fiction sensitive to claim 
type? One could attempt to avoid this question by saying that judgments about truth in fiction are 
not relevant to imaginative resistance. But we have tried to maintain a broad notion of imaginative 
resistance throughout, and judgments about truth in fiction are important for several authors in the 
literature. Still, the truth in fiction puzzle is distinct from the imaginability puzzle (Liao et al. 2014: 
342), and perhaps different philosophical accounts will be differently suited to explain these 
different puzzles. For example, those that focus on the authority of an author might be in a better 
position to explain our unwillingness to claim that a certain fictional statement is true in the fiction. 
While those who focus on our inability to process certain claims might be in a better position to 
explain our experienced difficulty in trying to imagine those claims. In any case, a complete 
account of imaginative resistance (in the broad sense including truth in fiction judgments) must 
make reference to content, and not just claim type. And if we want to preserve the asymmetry upon 
which the original puzzle of imaginative resistance is based, this can only be done, and only 
partially, in the domain of truth in fiction judgments. 
Summing up, in terms of difficulty and possibility, imaginative resistance depends largely 
on the weirdness of the content, not on whether the claim is evaluative or descriptive. Truth 
judgments, by contrast, are sensitive to features of content and claim type. In discussion, we have 
suggested that the weirdness of a scenario is relative to the individual, and might depend on its (i) 
unusualness, e.g., on how often a subject has experienced the content of the scenario; (ii) the 
perceived distance between the fictional and actual world, resulting from, e.g., the distance 
between the worldviews that are appropriate for each world; and (iii) surprisingness, resulting from 
violated expectations generated by previous experience, inference, or fictional context. We are left 
with many interesting questions, including finding other factors that contribute to weirdness. These 
might include the level of personal commitment to what is violated in the scenario, the 
epistemological authority of the author presenting the scenario, and how easy it is for the subject 
to understand the scenario or to work out the lower level facts that justify ascriptions of higher 
level properties in the scenario. These should be tested experimentally, where possible. Whatever 
weirdness turns out to be in the final analysis, it is not a property exclusive to counterevaluatives, 
and there is no curious asymmetry of imaginative resistance in the sense of a) difficulty imagining 
something or b) difficulty judging something to be (im)possible. There does, however, seem to be 
a version of the puzzle that survives. Namely: why is it that when it comes to deciding whether 
something is true in a fiction, we need to take into account whether that content is evaluative or 
descriptive? 
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Notes 
1 Names are in alphabetical order, the three authors contributed equally to this work. 
2 We define a “counterevaluative” as a statement that overturns a held evaluative belief, and 
a “counterdescriptive” as a statement that overturns a held non-evaluative belief. When we 
want to be less specific, we will use “counterfactual” to mean a claim that is either 
counterevaluative or counterdescriptive. 
3 Others who focus their attention on this assumption in its moral form include Brock (2012), 
Carruthers (2006), Currie (2002, 217), Dorsch (2016, 50), Driver (2008, 302), Kind (2016a, 
8; 2016b, 167), Kung (2016, 234), Mahtani (2012), Matravers (2003), Modrack (2016, 25), 
Nichols (2006, 3-4), Rosenbaum (2016), Liao (2016), Sauchelli (2016), Stear (2015), Stock 
(2005), Stokes (2006), and Stueber (2016: 375). 
4 Appendix 1 in the Supplementary Materials (https://osf.io/n5cpd/) contains the complete 
text of all scenarios and questions from the pilot study. 
5 See https://osf.io/n5cpd/ for Appendix 2. 
6 A potential worry: If weirdness correlated very strongly with the measures of imaginative 
resistance, one might be concerned that it captures the exact same phenomenon. A lack of 
correlation, by contrast, would cast doubt on the hypothesis that features related to the 
content of the target claim could be meaningful predictors of imaginative resistance. 
Weirdness correlated positively with judgments of truth in fiction (r=0.23, p<.001), 
difficulty (r=.52, p<.001), and possibility (r=.49, p<.001). With effect sizes just at the 
border between medium and large for difficulty and possibility, and a small effect size for 
truth in fiction, so we do not see any reason for concern. 
7 See https://osf.io/n5cpd/ for Appendix 3. 
8 One might object that a Dual Process Model of Imaginative Resistance cannot be inferred 
from the fact that claim type has a significant effect on truth but a non-significant effect on 
difficulty and possibility. After all, the difference between “significant” and “not 
significant” is not itself statistically significant (Gelman and Stern, 2006). However, the 
original mixed ANOVA (within-subjects factor: measure – truth vs. difficulty vs. 
possibility; between-subjects factors: claim type – evaluative vs. descriptive, degree – low 
vs. medium-low vs. medium-high vs. high) showed that the measure*claim type interaction 
F(1.80, 1509.02)=27.60, p<.001, 𝜂𝜂p2=.032 was significant, which means that claim type 
had a different effect on the three measures.  To see whether it was claim type’s effect on 
truth that differed significantly from claim type’s effect on difficulty and possibility, we 
further conducted two 2x2 ANOVAs: (i) 2 (evaluative x descriptive) x 2 (truth vs 
difficulty), and (ii) 2 (evaluative x descriptive) x 2 (truth vs possibility). For (i) truth vs 
difficulty, we found the claim type*measure interaction F(1, 842)=34.06, p<.001, 
𝜂𝜂p2=.039 was significant; claim type affected truth (Meval=4.48, Mdesc=2.89) 
significantly more than it affected difficulty (Meval=4.56, Mdesc=3.95). For (ii) truth vs 
possibility, we found the claim type*measure interaction F(1, 842)=35.50, p<.001, 
𝜂𝜂p2=.040 was significant; claim type affected truth (Meval=4.48, Mdesc=2.89) 
significantly more than it affected possibility (Meval=3.91, Mdesc=3.25). Hence, the effect 
of claim type on truth judgments differed significantly from the effect of claim type on 
difficulty and possibility judgments, which supports the Dual Process Model. 
9 This extends Walton’s account (1994), which also presents a supervenience-based account 
of imaginative resistance. Walton claims that moral facts supervene on natural facts, and 
so if we are told to imagine a different moral fact with the same natural facts, we cannot. 
Weatherson extends this from evaluatives to all facts. 
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